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Abstract 
The Indonesian government implemented a joint recapitalization program in 1999 to aid 
some of its private banks struggling with the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis. Nine 
banks were eligible, and seven ultimately participated. The program was voluntary; in 
order to participate, bank managers had to pass a test proving that they were competent 
enough to run their bank and create a three-year plan for the bank’s operations subject to 
independent assessment. All of the bank participants were able to return to the 4% 
minimum capital adequacy ratio by the end of the program.  




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial 
Crises at  
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 At a Glance 
In order to deal with the escalating 
effects of the Asian Economic Crisis on 
the banking sector, the Indonesian 
government announced a joint 
recapitalization plan for some of its 
surviving private banks in September 
1998. 
Banks were sorted into three categories 
based on an independent audit; those 
that had a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
of between –25% and +4% were 
categorized as “B” banks and were the 
only ones eligible for this joint 
recapitalization scheme. Nine banks 
were eligible, and of these, seven 
ultimately participated. 
There were several conditions for a B 
bank to enter joint recapitalization. The 
banks’ owners were required to create a 
business plan detailing the bank’s viability over a three-year period that would be assessed 
by independent advisors; if this plan was deemed acceptable, the managers then had to 
pass a test ensuring that they were technically competent enough to run their bank. After 
both of these conditions were satisfied, the bank’s private shareholders could decide 
whether to participate in recapitalization with the government. The joint recapitalization 
scheme was a voluntary program. 
If the bank’s private shareholders elected to participate in the government recapitalization 
program, the bank was required to provide 20% of the necessary capital, in cash, required 
to meet the 4% minimum CAR requirement for all Indonesian banks at the end of 1998. 
The bank’s owners remained in control of day-to-day operations while the government 
provided the other 80% of capital and became a controlling shareholder. The owners were 
given the first option to buy back their shareholdings after three years. 
Summary Evaluation 
The joint recapitalization program appeared to be effective in that it enabled the private 
banks to reach the CAR requirement of 4%. After a series of communication missteps, the 
program’s implementation was generally well received and the markets reacted positively 
to its announcement. Evaluations of the program frame it as somewhat successful, but 
there is not currently a robust evaluation of the program. 
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: Help private banks return to the 4% CAR 
requirement 
 
Announcement Date September 26, 1998 
Operational Date March 13, 1999 
Sunset Date Unknown 
Program Size Rp 300 trillion 
Usage Rp 644 trillion by December 
2000 
Outcomes  All banks achieved the 4% CAR 
requirement 
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Indonesia Context (1998 -1999) 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$98.23 billion in 1998 
$141.47 billion in 1999 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$464 in 1998 
$671 in 1999 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year 
senior debt) 
Data for 1998: 
S&P: B- 
Fitch: BB+ 
Data for 1999: 
Fitch: BB- 
Size of banking system 
$44.96 billion in 1998 
$56.32 billion in 1999 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP 
45.77% in 1998 
39.81% in 1999 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of financial system 
100% in 1998 
100% in 1999 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system 
60.27% in 1998 
73.36% in 1999 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
Data not available for 1998 
Data not available for 1999 
Government ownership of banking 
system 
Data not available for 1998 
Data not available for 1999 
Existence of deposit insurance 
No in 1998 
No in 1999 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World 
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Banks in Indonesia faced problems prior to the beginning of the financial crisis in 1997. In 
1992, Bank Indonesia (BI), Indonesia’s central bank, had been forced to resolve Bank 
Summa, a problem bank; the process was difficult, leading to anti-BI protests and 
contributing to a BI policy of resisting active intervention. Between 1992 and 1993, the 
World Bank contributed $300 million to a recapitalization worth $4 billion (4% of GDP) for 
state-owned banks. However, due to BI’s hands-off policies, banks falling into difficulty 
were left independent until 1997, when the crisis began (Enoch et al. 2001). 
Before the crisis, BI had limited authority in bank supervision, due to both the division of 
powers between the Minister of Finance and the central bank, as well as the appearance of 
lack of independence from President Soeharto. Following the end of President Soeharto’s 
tenure, amendments were made to increase the independence of BI (Sato 2005).  
The financial crisis began in Indonesia with authorities unpegging the rupiah from the Thai 
baht in July 1997 (Enoch et al. 2001). In the months following, the rupiah had depreciated 
by close to 40% (Enoch 2000). In October 1997, a policy package “aimed at restoring health 
to the banking sector” became part of an adjustment program agreed upon with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Enoch et al. 2001). At this point, the issues in the 
banking sector were not considered to be a systemic banking crisis (Enoch et al. 2001). In 
November 1997, the closing of 16 banks by the government eroded confidence in the 
banking sector, triggering a run on the banking system by depositors (Reiner 1998). 
This erosion of the banks’ deposit base meant that Bank Indonesia had to provide massive 
amounts of liquidity: during December 19974 alone, this support increased from 
Rp 13 trillion to Rp 31 trillion, equivalent to 5% of GDP (Sharma 2001). In addition, the IMF 
required a series of economic reforms to provide aid: a revision of growth forecasts to 0% 
from 4%, a revision of inflation forecasts to 20% from 9%, ending the Soeharto family 
monopolies, and a revision the 1998–1999 budget with the exchange rate calculated with a 
weaker exchange rate than before (Williams 1998). Contrary to these reforms, business 
groups receiving liquidity injections funneled public funding exceeding the legal lending 
limit to the businesses they owned (Reiner 1998). 
In January 1998, the rupiah headed into free fall. The exchange rate fell further, and the 
banking sector’s problems deteriorated into a “full-fledged systemic crisis” (Lindgren et al. 
1999). In its 1998–1999 annual report, BI notes that multiple factors contributed to the 
instability in the banking system. Internal difficulties emerged from unprofessional 
management, where outside interests were able to influence decision-making within 
banks; banks would lend to certain groups and their own subsidiaries, exceeding the legal 
lending limit numerous times (BI 1999). Additionally, short-term unhedged foreign loans 
were used to finance long-term rupiah projects, leading to a currency mismatch 
exacerbated by the depreciation of the rupiah (BI 1999; Enoch et al. 2001). 
In response to the crisis, the government announced a new three-pronged approach to 
preserve financial stability: (1) the complete protection of all depositors and creditors in 
 
4 During Q4 1997, the exchange rate of rupiah to USD stood at 4,650 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Federal Reserve Economic Data). 
172
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
domestic banks; (2) the establishment of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) 
to supervise, guide, and restructure ailing banks and manage their nonperforming assets; 
and (3) a proposal for the handling of corporate restructuring (Enoch et al. 2001; 
Indonesian Government 1998a). 
In mid-February 1998, IBRA proposed that all banks that had borrowed at least twice their 
capital base from BI should be managed by the agency, and 54 banks—accounting for 
36.7% of the banking sector—were invited to apply to IBRA for management. Each bank 
applied, and IBRA officials joined the banks’ offices the next week. However, President 
Soeharto decided that the work of IBRA officials should have no publicity, decreasing the 
credibility of IBRA and making it seem as though the agency was still nonoperational. The 
first head of IBRA was removed within a month of the agency’s operation, under the 
reasoning that he was doing his job too diligently (Enoch et al. 2001). 
At this point, more than 75% of liquidity support to the banking system went to seven 
banks, holding 16% of the liabilities in the system (Enoch 2000). The banks had each 
borrowed at least Rp 2 trillion (equivalent to $240 million) (Enoch 2000). In the months 
following, IBRA performed a series of examinations and bank closures under new 
directorship, including audits by international auditors or IBRA and BI officials of the 16 
strongest private banks in the system under IBRA (Enoch et al. 2001). The results of the 
audits were leaked to the public, showing 55%–90% of total portfolios comprised 
nonperforming loans. Many of the portfolios were highly interconnected. Authorities 
realized that Indonesia needed to develop stability in the financial system, even if the banks 
were not fully solvent in the event of a financial crisis (Enoch et al. 2001). 
In September 1998, the government announced a new set of measures to combat the crisis: 
resolving the banks already under IBRA; restructuring state-owned banks; and finally 
providing joint recapitalizations under strict conditions for private and regional 
development banks (Enoch et al. 2001). The purpose of the plan was to preserve only the 
best private banks in the banking sector and build burden sharing of the costs of bank 
resolution between the private sector and the government (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
Prior to the execution of the private bank restructuring, the Indonesian government and 
the IMF came up with a plan to recapitalize all seven of the state banks (Sharma 2001). 
Four of these (which together comprised half the assets of the Indonesian banking sector) 
were merged into the new Bank Mandiri, which became Indonesia’s largest bank and, as a 
result, held 30% of all deposits (Fane and McLeod 2002; Sharma 2001). 
Program Description 
On September 26, 1998, the governor of the BI announced a new government plan to 
restructure the private banks, most of which were insolvent (Enoch 2000).5 The 
recapitalization scheme was announced publicly by joint decree between the Ministry of 
Finance and Bank Indonesia on December 31, 1998 Indonesian Government 1998b;  
Jakarta Post 1998b). This plan was not implemented until March 1999 (Enoch 2000). 
The recapitalization scheme was overseen by IBRA, though there were representatives 
from BI, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank through the process. 
IBRA acted as a representative shareholder for the government, as well as controlling 
shareholder. Additionally, outside consultants were hired to estimate the amount of 
 
5 This plan benefited private commercial banks, state banks, and provincial banks; however, information on 
implementation or outcomes for provincial banks could not be found. 
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performing assets on bank balance sheets (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004). The injected 
capital appears to have been jointly managed by BI and IBRA. It is unclear how much IBRA 
handled specifically, but Sharma (2001) mentions that IBRA deposited the 80% of 
government funds for joint recapitalization, which implies that the organization had 
oversight over the day-to-day activities. The MOF oversaw IBRA (Sharma 2001). 
The large restructuring plan was predicated upon a review of all private banks, audited by 
a group of international accounting firms that estimated the capital needed to recapitalize 
each bank and sorted banks into three categories (Fane and McLeod 2002). Banks were 
sorted into categories based on capitalization status: “A” banks, with capital adequacy 
ratios (CARs) greater than 4%; “B” banks, with capital adequacy ratios between –25% and 
+4%; and “C” banks, with capital adequacy ratios lower than –25% (Enoch et al. 2001). The 
lower threshold of –25% was chosen as many of the “best” banks in the system had capital 
ratios of –20%, and few banks fell below that value (Enoch et al. 2001). 
Banks submitted their financial statements as of December 31, 1998, for committees to 
determine the state of their balance sheets. Committees evaluated loan portfolios, 
examining credit by a five-level classification: performing, substandard, doubtful, 
nonperforming, and default. Uniquely, the government placed the responsibility for 
resolving group-affiliated nonperforming loans on the controlling shareholders of 
companies rather than the companies that received the loans. To determine the level of 
assistance needed, the government considered off-balance-sheet commitments, productive 
assets, non-earning assets, contingent liabilities needing reassessment, transactions of 
related parties, transactions of subsidiaries, and events that may have happened after the 
December 31, 1998 (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004). 
After estimating the condition of banks and giving owners of “C” banks the opportunity to 
raise capital, private banks in the Indonesian financial system were separated into three 
categories: 
• Seventy-three banks, representing 5.7% of the banking sector’s assets, were “A” 
banks, and as such, continued to operate without government support (Enoch 
2000). 
• Of the “B” banks, nine (representing 10% of the banking sector’s assets), were 
eligible for joint recapitalization; seven (representing 2.5% of the banking 
sector’s assets) had failed the tests, but if they had at least 80,000 depositors, 
were set to be taken over by IBRA;6 and 19 (representing 2% of the banking 
sector’s assets) were to be closed (Enoch 2000). 
• Nineteen banks,7 representing 3% of the banking sector’s assets, were “C” banks 
and were to be immediately shuttered (Enoch 2000). 
Six of the seven major state banks had capital adequacy ratios less than –25%, placing them 
squarely in the “C” category of banks to be shut down (Reiner 1998). However, the 
 
6 This joint recapitalization and IBRA takeover of some of the category “B” banks was done instead of 
enforcing closure to “minimize disruption to the payment system.” Additionally, the owners of these banks 
were barred from assuming future roles as bank managers (Sharma 2001). 
7 Discrepancy: Lindgren et al. (1999) say there were 17 of these banks but that 38 total were to be closed—
indicating that these authors believe that 21 category “B” banks were closed, rather than 19. 
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government announced these banks were too big to fail, with state-owned banks 
accounting for 70% of banking sector liabilities, and therefore were to be recapitalized 
instead of closed (Enoch et al. 2001). 
“B” banks were the only category eligible for joint recapitalization with the government. 
There were several conditions for a “B” bank to enter joint recapitalization. First, banks 
seeking recapitalization were required to submit business plans spanning three years 
(Indonesian Government 1998b).  
In addition to proposing a business plan detailing the bank’s viability over a three-year 
period, bank managers had to pass a test ensuring that they were technically competent 
enough to run their bank (Fane and McLeod 2002). This technical test was based off of a 
review of a portfolio, as well as the experience and knowledge of BI officials (Enoch et al. 
2001). The fit-and-proper test consisted of several items, including:  
(1) A written commitment to Bank Indonesia, 
(2) Engagement of delinquent individuals in the banking sector, 
(3) Engagement of bad debts in the banking sector, 
(4) Integrity, 
(5) Any interventions in bank operations, 
(6) Any violations of prudential principles by directors or commissioners, and 
(7) Competence and independence (BI 1999). 
The 20% of capital required to raise the CAR had to be supplied in cash, at which point the 
government provided the remaining amount in the form of newly issued bonds. Some of 
these bonds had fixed nominal interest rates and others had variable nominal rates; 
originally, the government intended to use variable-interest-rate bonds to raise banks’ 
equity to 0% and fixed-interest-rate bonds to raise equity to 4%. However, in practice, 
some of the fixed-rate bonds were used to bring banks’ capital to 0% (Fane and McLeod 
2002). However, during performance contract negotiations, the government decided to 
keep its shares as ordinary stock instead of preference shares, as had been initially planned 
(Lindgren et al. 1999). 
After bank management provided a business plan and passed a fit-and-proper test, the 
bank’s private shareholders could decide whether to participate8 in recapitalization with 
the government (Fane and McLeod 2002). If the bank’s private shareholders elected to 
participate in the government recapitalization program, the operation proceeded as 
follows. The bank provided 20% of the necessary capital, in cash, required to meet the 4% 
minimum CAR requirement for all Indonesian banks at the end of 1998. The bank’s owners 
remained in control of day-to-day operations while the government provided the other 
80% of capital and became a controlling shareholder. The owners were given call options 
to buy back their shareholdings after three years (Enoch 2000). 
 
8 If the private shareholders elected not to participate, the banks were nationalized, and they received 
nothing in return (Fane and McLeod 2002). 
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The government’s equity stake (in preference shares) was convertible into ordinary shares 
in two situations:  
(1) If the bank could not adhere to its business plan (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
(2) After three years (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
In practice, the government acquired ordinary shares rather than preference shares. The 
banks remained able to reacquire their shares during the three-year period by paying the 
government back either for their account or an outside investor. At the end of the three-
year period, the bank’s value was independently assessed and the owners had the first 
option to buy back their shareholdings. If the owners did not buy back their shares, the 
government sold them over the course of the next year (Lindgren et al. 1999).  
Private shareholders of banks participating in the capitalization scheme also received call 
options over the government shares purchased. The government made these call options 
available to private shareholders who provided the 20% of the capital for injection. The call 
options provided an opportunity for shareholders weary of participating in the scheme to 
profit from the recovery of the bank that had been recapitalized, as share prices for the 
options were set equal to the issue price of the banks shares, plus any accumulated interest 
(Fane and McLeod 2002). Shareholders were also provided certificates of entitlement 
(COEs), an instrument tradable on the capital market. These COEs entitled the asset holder 
to proceeds of collections and sales of assets transferred to IBRA over a specified period, 
with the idea of increasing the incentive to participate in the recapitalization process (Suta, 
Musa, and Slangor 2004).  
The joint decree establishing the parameters for recapitalization also placed requirements 
on boards. As required by the decree, each commercial bank participating in the 
recapitalization program required shareholders to elect a member to each bank’s board to 
serve as a compliance director. The board member’s appointment also required Bank 
Indonesia’s approval. Compliance directors were required to submit the ongoing results of 
the recapitalization to Bank Indonesia quarterly (Indonesian Government 1998b). 
The original budget for the joint restructuring allocated Rp 300 trillion of bonds to finance 
the recapitalization, as well as an additional Rp 34 trillion due to the interest rate paid on 
the capital injected paid for in both issued bonds and the liquidation of assets ( Jakarta Post 
1999b). However, upon beginning capital injections, the costs expanded. By the end of the 
capitalizations, the government had spent slightly above Rp 500 trillion, with state banks 
accounting for Rp 303.4 trillion of the allocations and private banks accounting for 
Rp 199.2 trillion (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004).   
IBRA asset recovery moved slower than expected, as seen in Figure 1. While IBRA 
optimistically estimated its recovery rate at approximately 40% of the book value of the 
assets, in reality, the agency was only able to recover little more than half of the estimated 
recovery by 2002.  
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Figure 1: Cost of Indonesia’s Bank Restructuring by August 2002 







Total assets transferred to IBRA (Rp trillion) 548.3 212.2 111.3 
Asset Management Credit 275.2 96.3 75.5 
 Core loan assets from private and state banks 262.4 — — 
 Noncore assets 12.8 — — 
Asset Management Investment1 141.4 76.4 17.8 
Bank Restructuring Unit2 131.7 39.5 18 
Total liabilities issued (Rp trillion) 703.6 703.6 703.6 
Government bonds to Bank Indonesia 268.3 — — 
Government bonds to recapitalized banks 435.3 — — 
Total assets minus liabilities –155.3 –491.4 –592.3 
Notes: (1) Corporate equity as shareholders’ settlements; (2) net book value of government investment in 
recapitalized banks and banks that were taken over. 
Source: Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu 2003. 
Outcomes 
Initially, seventy banks (49 of which were domestic commercial banks, 15 of which were 
provincial development banks, and six of which were state banks) were eligible for 
recapitalization as part of the “B” group (Jakarta Post 1998a). 
Ultimately, seven private banks were recapitalized in 1999 (Sharma 2001).9,10 Though just 
nine “B” banks were later eligible for joint recapitalization, only seven owners provided 
their share of the cash capital ahead of the April 20, 1999, deadline. The remaining two 
banks had more complex situations that embroiled IBRA in “intense discussions” leading 
up to the deadline; one of them was ultimately acquired by a major foreign bank, and the 
other was unable to provide capital and was subsequently taken over by IBRA (Lindgren et 
al. 1999). 
During the month of May 1999, the government worked with the remaining banks 
undergoing recapitalizations and established performance contracts and memoranda of 
understanding. Further audits revealed that the amount of capital these banks needed was 
double the initial estimation; the banks provided their share of the extra capital by the end 
of May 1999 (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
Overall, composition of assets in the banking sector changed after the capital injection, as 
shown in Figure 2. Banks during this time continued to accrue losses due to the negative 
interest rate spread emerging from currency mismatch in short-term-lending-funded 
projects. Private banks faced the largest drop in gross revenue amongst all banks in the 
system, dropping by 12.5%. State banks held the largest share of deposits in the system, 
48.9% (an increase of 60.1%) due to government measures appointing state banks to pay 
 
9 Discrepancy: Nasution (2000) accounts that “the recapitalized banks include[d] 49 private banks (including 
13 taken over by the government) . . . ” (Nasution 2000). 
10 Discrepancy: Sato (2005) writes that the recapitalizations took place toward the end of 2000 (Sato 2005). 
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cash to depositors of those banks liquidated by the government. Finally, foreign loans at 
banks dropped by Rp 20.0 trillion (a 16.7% drop); with creditors reluctant to extend loans, 
new requirements asked debtors to pay all matured loans rather than roll them over (Bank 
Indonesia 1999).  
Figure 2: Total Assets by Bank Grouping 
    
Outstanding  
(in trillions of 
Rp)   
Percent  
Change   
Share1  
(in percent) 
  1997/98 1998/99  1997/98 1998/99  1997/98 1998/99 
Commercial Banks  737.6 645.8  84.6 –12.5  100 100 
State Banks  296.2 258.8  107.6 –12.6  40.2 40.1 
Private National 
Banks  319.2 263  51.2 –17.6  43.2 40.7 
Regional Government 
Banks  11.8 22.4  6.3 89.8  1.6 3.5 
Joint Banks  60.1 50.1  204.9 –16.6  8.1 7.8 
Foreign Banks  59.9 58.5  254.7 –2.3  8.1 9.1 
Rural Credit Banks2   2.9 2.8   6.6 –3.4   0.4 0.4 
Notes: (1) Share of each group to commercial banks; (2) as of the end of December 1998. 
Source: BI 1999. 
Public contribution to financial sector restructuring totaled 51% of GDP by mid-1999, and 
the vast majority of this expenditure was to recapitalize the banks and lend liquidity 
support (Sharma 2001). The breakdown of the public’s contribution to financial sector 
restructuring can be seen in Figure 4. 
By December 2000, the total amount of government bonds issued to recapitalize the banks 
had reached Rp 644 trillion, equivalent to 58% of GDP in 1999 (Fane and McLeod 2002). 
The final cost of recapitalization ultimately reached Rp 502.5 trillion, with state banks 
accounting for Rp 303.4 trillion of the allocations and private banks accounting for Rp 
199.2 trillion (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004). Figure 3 shows the number of shares 
purchased by IBRA through the recapitalization.  
Figure 3: Government Holdings of Private Bank Shares 
Bank Number of Shares Value1 % 
BII 52,691,346,000 6,586,418 56.78% 
Bank Lippo 23,203,407,899 6,027,874 59.26% 
Universal 30,018,085,856 4,084,201 78.65% 
Arta Media 6,460,440,000 130,000 76.91% 
Bukopin 6,379,675,501 364,916 74.75% 
Patriot 1,059,537 51,500 80.99% 
Prima Express 1,772,734 530,911 88.64% 
 
Note: (1) In millions of rupiah, after deduction of returned excess bonds and exercise of share option rights, as of 
December 31, 2000. 
Source: BI 2001. 
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Ultimately, “government-held shares in nationalized and recapitalized banks were almost 
sold off by 2004. The bank reconstruction [took place] on a scale far larger than initially 
expected [and] was all but completed in seven years” (Sato 2005). 
Figure 4: Public Cost of Financial Sector Restructuring in Indonesia as of 1999 
  Percent of GDP In Billions of US dollars1 
Central bank liquidity support assumed by 
the budget 
12 20 
Recapitalization including outlays for 
deposit guarantee 
23 40 
Purchases of nonperforming loans or 
capital for asset management company 
12 20 
Interest cost (on budget) 3 5 
Total 51 85 
Note: (1) Converted at 7,500 rupiahs per US dollar.  
Source: Lindgren et al. 1999. 
However, “as a percentage of GDP, the amount of government bonds needed to recapitalize 
the banks [was] more than four times the proportion initially estimated” (Fane and McLeod 
2002). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The bank recapitalization plan of March 1999 was part of a larger strategy to 
restore the banking sector to health. 
The government pursued a three-pronged strategy: resolving the banks already under 
IBRA; restructuring state-owned banks; and finally providing joint recapitalization under 
strict conditions for private and regional development banks (Enoch et al. 2001). The 
purposes of the plan were to preserve only the best private banks in the banking sector and 
build burden sharing of the costs of bank resolution between the private sector and the 
government (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
This intervention was accompanied by monetary policy tightening by BI. The increased 
interest rates were meant to reduce excess liquidity in the system (BI 1999). 
Additionally, the capital injections were complemented by a simultaneous debt 
restructuring plan to deal with the banks’ nonperforming loans, the details of which can be 
seen in another YPFS case (Smith and Nunn 2021). 
In May 1999, the government moved to improve supervision and regulation with an 
amendment to the 1968 Central Bank Act. Under this new act, Bank Indonesia was 
guaranteed full independence to conduct monetary policy and given priority in supervision 
and regulation over any other government entity (Sato 2005). With assistance from the 
World Bank, Bank Indonesia began to formulate “a master strategy for strengthening Bank 
Indonesia’s regulatory, supervisory, and examination activities” (Sato 2005). 
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2. Bank Indonesia had the legal authority to recapitalize under its designated 
powers as a central bank, established by the legislature. 
In May 1999, a new Central Bank Act (Act No. 23 of 1999) was enacted, replacing the 
Central Bank Act of 1968. This act provided the bank the ability to issue and revoke bank 
licenses, as well as supervise banks. It also reinforced the independence of BI, which at the 
time was being questioned under the regime of President Soeharto. Finally, the act gave BI 
complete monopoly on bank control and supervision, prohibiting intervention by any other 
organization in these matters (Sato 2005).  
Under the new act, BI had purview to make temporary capital investment in banks (Sato 
2005). With this legal backing, the Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia issued a joint 
decree on December 31, 1998, outlining the structure of the recapitalization program 
(Indonesian Government 1998b). 
While the structure of the legal regulations and limitations on the BI changed in response 
to the financial crisis, this structure did not specifically change in support of the joint 
recapitalization project. 
3. Despite positive reactions to various bank closures and restructuring 
announcements, public confidence in the banks eligible for joint recapitalization 
faltered due to some confusion caused by an initial emphasis on forced mergers 
of these banks. 
The announcement of the various bank closures and restructurings on March 13, 1999, 
received a positive reaction. It had been formulated in conjunction with public relations 
efforts including specialist consultants, and the markets reacted positively. However, public 
confidence in the banks eligible for joint recapitalization faltered due to some confusion 
and negative public comments, leading to runs and a dearth of liquidity (Enoch 2000). 
This confusion may have been due to President Habibie’s announcement in December 1998 
that, rather than the recapitalization plan, there would instead be a strategy of forced 
mergers. After a brief period of rioting, market uncertainty, and further depreciation of the 
rupiah, the government reaffirmed the private bank recapitalizations, and the parliament 
passed a budget for it in February 1999 (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
As such, the public expected that bank closures and restructurings would take place before 
the end of February; however, two days before the expected implementation of the plan 
(the weekend of February 26, 1999), the government postponed it yet again on the grounds 
that there was a lack of political consensus surrounding the plan for several of the banks. 
The public reacted negatively, with some belief that decisions were influenced by outside 
factors. Over the next two weeks, political consensus was achieved, and “B” banks lacking 
acceptable business plans were permitted to resubmit their plans (Enoch 2000). 
A further interesting aspect to the communication of the joint recapitalization plan was 
that upon its implementation, on March 13, 1999, the government generally reaffirmed the 
terms of its original commitment but neglected to “explicitly restate its earlier commitment 
to leave the day-to-day running of the banks in the hands of the owners” (Lindgren et al. 
1999). 
During May 1999, when further audits revealed that banks needed more capital than had 
initially been estimated, the government communicated to the public that it would continue 
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to provide 80% of the necessary capital for joint recapitalization. For the largest private 
recapitalized bank, this strategy was especially successful in attracting private investment 
(Lindgren et al. 1999). 
4. The injected capital appears to have been jointly managed by BI and IBRA. 
Sato (2005) writes that “Bank Indonesia, which was formerly placed under the executive 
branch of government and given only limited authority, was legally guaranteed 
independence from the government and obtained broad authority over the banks.” 
The MOF oversaw IBRA (Indonesian Government 1998a). It is unclear how much IBRA 
handled specifically, but Sharma (2001) mentions that IBRA deposited the 80% of 
government funds for joint recapitalization, which implies that the organization had 
oversight over the day-to-day activities. 
5. IBRA injected newly issued interest-bearing government bonds into banks. 
The original budget for the joint restructuring allowed for about Rp 300 trillion of bonds to 
finance the recapitalizations. Of the Rp 300 trillion of bonds, the recapitalizations required 
an additional Rp 34 trillion due to the interest rate paid on the capital injected paid for in 
both bonds and through the liquidation of assets from closed banks ( Jakarta Post 1999b). 
However, upon beginning capital injections, the costs expanded. By the end of the 
capitalizations, the government had spent slightly above Rp 500 trillion, with state banks 
accounting for Rp 303.4 trillion of the allocations and private banks accounting for Rp 
199.2 trillion (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004). The capital injections were funded by newly 
issued government bonds (Fane and McLeod 2002).  
6. Management of banks seeking recapitalization had to pass a fit-and-proper test; 
the government also required banks to submit business plans as well as raise 
20% of the capital required to meet a 4% capital adequacy ratio. 
Banks had to fall into one of three categories (the “B” category) to be eligible for joint 
recapitalization: 
(1) “A” group—banks with CARs estimated to be more than 4% that did not 
require government support, 
(2) “B” group—banks with CARs between –25% and 4%—at the time, no “B” bank 
had a positive CAR (Fane and McLeod 2002), 11 or 
(3) “C” group—banks with CARs below –25%, which were not eligible to receive 
government support and were to be liquidated (Fane and McLeod 2002). 
 
11 Once a recapitalization was agreed upon, the bank’s most severely impaired (Category 5) loans were 
transferred at no price to IBRA’s Asset Management Unit (AMU/AMC), which then entered into a contract 
with the originating bank for the recovery of the loans. Banks could, at their discretion, also transfer loans 
classified as doubtful to the AMU/AMC for the same treatment. “Any recoveries from such loans would be 
used immediately to buy back the government’s preference shares, thus giving the government the prospect 
of an early return of its financial infusion, and reducing the amount to be paid by the owners to reacquire full 
control of their bank” (Fane and McLeod 2002; Lindgren et al. 1999). 
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Nine of the banks classified as category “B” (with capital ratios of between –25% and 4%) 
were eventually eligible for recapitalization (Sharma 2001). 
First, banks seeking recapitalization were required to submit business plans spanning 
three years (Indonesian Government 1998b). The work plan for commercial banks eligible 
for recapitalization under the scheme required that a series of points be addressed: 
(1)  The current condition of the bank and weaknesses needing attention; 
(2) Any assumptions made in creating the plan; 
(3) Steps and a schedule for resolution of problem loans and nonperforming property 
loans; 
(4) The bank’s strategy to improve performance and health, both short and long term; 
(5) Financial projections to achieve a capital adequacy ratio of 8% by 2001; 
(6) Plans to settle with BI within three years of injection, with repayment of 20% the 
first year, 30% in the second and third years, and 50% of the remaining balance per 
year ongoing; 
(7)  plan to meet capital shortages; 
(8) Plans to resolve violations of legal lending limits no later than a year after signing 
the recapitalization agreement with BI; 
(9)  A plan to resolve net open position violations; and 
(10) Any planned mergers with other commercial banks (Indonesian Government 
1998b).12 
Banks were encouraged to include mergers in their business plans with two or more banks, 
with projections based on such a merger (Enoch et al. 2001). Banks placed in category 
“A”—having a capital ratio above 4%—were also required to submit business plans, though 
only a subset of the list above (points 1–7) were required (Indonesian Government 1998b). 
The recapitalizations required four committees to consider banks’ submissions of business 
plans. The Steering Committee’s members consisted of the minister of finance and BI’s 
governor. The Policy Committee, consisting of BI’s regulation and development directors, 
BI’s supervision directors, IBRA’s chairman, and the directorate general of the Ministry of 
Finance, examined the validity of the business plan, administered a fit-and-proper test to 
shareholders, and provided a recommendation on a commercial bank’s participation in the 
recapitalization to the Steering Committee. The Evaluation Committee had representatives 
from BI, the Ministry of Finance, and IBRA, and existed to assess submitted business plans 
and provide a recommendation to the Policy Committee on the eligibility of the business 
plans as well as the results of the fit-and-proper test. This committee also supervised the 
implementation of business plans and reported to the Policy Committee.  
 
12 Translation based on Google Translate. 
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Finally, the Technical Committee, also with representations from BI, IBRA, and the MOF, 
evaluated business plans as well as assessed the results of the fit-and-proper test. The 
Technical Committee could employ outside consultants to assess business plans. 
Additionally, representatives from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and IMF 
attended committee meetings to monitor the decision-making process as nonvoting 
members in each committee (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004). 
However, the international consultants hired tended toward a more negative view of banks 
than the BI did due to low confidence externally in the possibility of loan recovery. To 
address the mismatch, the above four-stage committee process was created whereby BI, 
the Ministry of Finance, and IBRA assessed valuations and recommendations by the 
external consultants and determined a policy decision in tandem. In the event of 
irreconcilable differences between the external consultants and the bank evaluation 
committees, the BI evaluation took precedence because the central bank was primarily 
responsible for the capital injections (Enoch et al. 2001). 
Due to bank management being perceived as unprofessional in allowing outside 
interference and as lacking in competency and integrity, after proposing a business plan, 
bank managers had to pass a test ensuring that they were technically competent enough to 
run their bank (BI 1999; Fane and McLeod 2002). This technical test was based off of a 
review of a portfolio, as well as the experience and knowledge of BI officials. Banks were 
also required to provide a share of the capital to be injected in the recapitalization (Enoch 
et al. 2001). The fit-and-proper test consisted of several items, including:  
(1) A written commitment to Bank Indonesia, 
(2) Engagement of delinquent individuals in the banking sector, 
(3) Engagement of bad debts in the banking sector, 
(4) Integrity, 
(5) Any interventions in bank operations, 
(6) Any violations of prudential principles by directors or commissioners, and 
(7) Competence and independence (BI 1999). 
Once bank owners agreed to joint recapitalization, the bank was required to provide 20% 
of the capital required to reach a 4% CAR requirement in cash, and the government 
provided the remaining 80%. The government became a large shareholder of the bank, 
with owners in daily control. The owners received prioritized call options13 to buy back 
their shareholdings at the end of three years (Enoch 2000). The government saw leaving 
 
13 As Fane and McLeod (2002) state:  
For each bank, the number of options issued was equal to the number of shares acquired by the 
government. Their exercise date was set three years after recapitalization and their exercise price was set 
equal to the issue price of the new shares, plus an allowance for accumulated interest during these three 
years. The total number of new shares was set at 100 times the number of shares already in existence 
prior to recapitalization, and the issue price of the new shares was calculated to ensure that the value of 
new equity injected into each bank was enough to raise its CAR to 4 percent, given the auditors’ estimate 
of the value and average risk-weight of its existing assets. 
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owners in day-to-day control of the bank as a way to encourage them to contribute new 
capital (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
However, state banks were not subject to the same requirements for capital injection. Due 
to ongoing restructuring of the state banks because of repeated failures of previous 
recapitalizations, these banks were not required to submit business plans. Additionally, 
recapitalization funds were tranched to maintain the momentum of operational 
restructuring (Enoch et al. 2001).  
Foreign and joint venture banks were excluded from the recapitalization program 
(Nasution 2000). 
7. Bank Indonesia allocated enough capital for each participating bank to reach a 
4% capital adequacy ratio. 
Rather than ask each bank to apply for specific capital injection amounts, BI allocated 
enough capital for each participating bank to reach a 4% capital adequacy ratio 
(Indonesian Government 1998b).  
8. The capital provided had several parameters. 
The capital injections were funded by newly issued government bonds. Originally, the 
government planned to utilize variable-interest-rate bonds to raise capital adequacy ratios 
to 0% and fixed-interest-rate bonds to cover the additional 4% to reach a 4% capital 
adequacy ratio. However, in practice, some of the fixed-rate bonds were used to bring 
banks’ capital to 0% (Fane and McLeod 2002). 
The variable-rate bonds paid interest between 13% and 15% per year, paid every three 
months, with a three- to 15-year maturity period, whereas fixed-rate bonds paid interest 
between 12% and 14% per year with interest paid every sixth months. When the 
Indonesian government increased interest rates in 2000 to more than 17%, the 
government offered a bond exchange to increase the rates of the fixed-rate bonds to be 
more attractive, with new bonds carrying coupon rates of 10%–15% with five- to 10-year 
maturity periods. In addition, to hedge for exchange rate risk, the government issued hedge 
bonds linked to the Rp/USD exchange rate. Every three months, the interest rate and 
nominal value of the hedge bond was reevaluated based on the exchange rate—so the 
depreciation of the rupiah increased the nominal value of the hedge bond. The interest rate 
was based on the Singapore Interbank Borrowing Rate (Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu 
2003). 
Additionally, while bonds were intended to bring capital adequacy ratio upwards, the 
banks were injected with cash from a yearly interest payment on bonds (Jakarta Post 
1999a). Interest payments alone were estimated to amount to Rp 34 trillion (Jakarta Post 
1999a). The bonds were tradable (Lindgren et al. 1999). 
Private shareholders of banks participating in the capitalization scheme also received call 
options over the government shares purchased. The government made these call options 
available to private shareholders who provided the 20% of the capital for injection. The 
price of these options was the share issuance price, plus accumulated interest; the total 
number of new shares was 100 times the number of shares existing before recapitalization. 
Issue price was determined such that the value of new equity met the 4% threshold given 
auditors’ estimates of the value of the bank’s assets. The call options provided an 
opportunity for shareholders weary of participating in the scheme to profit from the 
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recovery of the bank that had been recapitalized, as share prices for the options were set 
equal to the issue price of the bank’s shares, plus any accumulated interest (Fane and 
McLeod 2002). 
Shareholders were also provided certificates of entitlement, an instrument tradable on the 
capital market. These COEs entitled the asset holder to proceeds of collections and sales of 
assets transferred to IBRA over a specified period, with the idea of increasing the incentive 
to participate in the recapitalization process. The COEs had no underlying commitment 
from the government to pay the holder (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004).  
These agreements with shareholders were met with public controversy as they were 
perceived as disadvantageous to the government while advantageous to the shareholder. 
However, the government used the recapitalization terms as an opportunity to encourage 
controlling shareholders to incur the costs of the recapitalization, as well as provide itself 
an exit strategy in divestment through the call options on government-owned shares (Suta, 
Musa, and Slangor 2004).  
9. Indonesian capital markets regulation created difficulty in share issuances 
necessary to raise capital to participate in the recapitalization. 
Due to Indonesian capital markets regulation, the process for raising capital was slightly 
hindered for banks. The government required private banks to issue new shares to 
increase liquidity available in the recapitalization scheme, but Indonesian regulation 
required a preemptive rights issue as shareholder protection. The process for rights issues 
was lengthy, causing delays in the recapitalization process. While the Financial Services 
Authority of Indonesia issued a regulation allowing direct public offerings, there were 
protests within the agency over this method as it lacked protection of minority 
shareholders. To combat this, the Financial Services Authority required all banks 
undergoing recapitalization to undertake a rights issue, preventing banks from raising 
capital through direct public offerings and creating delays in the process (Enoch et al. 
2001).  
10. Oversight and governance of the participating banks was an ongoing issue 
throughout the program. 
These governance issues applied to all of the Indonesian government’s efforts to salvage its 
banking system, not just the joint recapitalization program. The issues were “diverse,” and 
included problems with “each of the principal institutions involved,” such as BI and IBRA, 
leading to public perception of a lack of commitment to reform of the banking sector 
(Enoch et al. 2001). 
Though able to coerce debtors into promises in reworking loans, IBRA struggled to enforce 
such promises. Not allowed to use existing powers to legally seize court assets, the agency 
was forced to take debtors to court. There, it lost four of every five cases. Under pressure to 
sell assets so that revenues could contribute to the budgetary deficit under IMF 
provisioning, IBRA often sold assets cheaply to foreign buyers ready with cash (Arnold 
2003).  
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11. There were consequences for the owners of the banks undergoing 
recapitalization. 
IBRA replaced the management of the banks; almost all of the banks eligible for joint 
recapitalization had provided their share of the capital; and the markets reacted well to the 
news (Enoch 2000). 
The owners of the banks that chose to participate in recapitalization were banned from 
managing other banks in the future (Sharma 2001). While state and regional banks did not 
face changes in ownership, of the 42 business-group-affiliated private banks involved in 
recapitalization or restructuring, only seven kept their doors open without ownership 
changes; of those, only one major bank—Bank Panin, not a participant in the 
recapitalization scheme—was left untouched (Sato 2005). 
The government often sold shares of banks not affiliated with groups; rather than sole 
acquisitions, groups of investors purchased shares of banks. Of the recapitalized banks, 
Bank Internasional Indonesia was sold to Temasek Group of Singapore and Kookmin Bank 
of Korea (Sato 2005). 
The joint decree establishing the parameters for recapitalization also placed requirements 
on boards. Shareholders of each commercial bank participating in the recapitalization 
program were required to elect a member to each bank’s board to serve as a compliance 
director. The board member’s appointment also required Bank Indonesia’s approval. 
Compliance directors were required to submit the ongoing results of the recapitalization to 
Bank Indonesia quarterly (Indonesian Government 1998b). 
12. The joint recapitalization program had a multi-pronged exit strategy. 
The banks remained able to reacquire their shares during the three-year period by paying 
the government back either for their account or an outside investor. At the end of the three-
year period, the bank’s value was independently assessed and the owners had the first 
option to buy back their shareholdings. If the owners did not buy back their shares, the 
government sold them over the course of the next year (Lindgren et al. 1999).  
According to an IMF report from 2000, even if banks reached the 4% CAR requirement, BI 
and IBRA continued to monitor the banks, as the CAR requirement increased to 8% for end-
2001 (Giorgianni et al. 2000). The status of the various banks’ CARs can be seen in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Banks’ Performance as of March 2000 
 Capital Adequacy Ratio (%) 
  Business Plan Reported 
Bank Lippo 14.9 17.6 
BII 5.5 5.2 
Universal 4.0 5.2 
Bukopin 4.0 12.4 
Prima Express 4.0 5.7 
Arta Media 4.0 9.5 
Patriot 8.0 16.6 
Source: Giorgianni et al. 2000. 
III. Evaluation 
The announcement of the various bank closures and restructurings on March 13, 1999, 
formulated in conjunction with public relations efforts, including specialist consultants, 
received a positive reaction from the markets. “The general feeling was that finally the 
authorities had a full grip on the banking situation” (Enoch 2000). After the 
recapitalizations, bank runs subsided (BI 1999). However, providing extended timelines to 
raise the capital necessary for recapitalizations made space for increased uncertainty in the 
markets and provided opportunity for depositor withdrawals (Enoch et al. 2001). Public 
confidence in the banks eligible for joint recapitalization faltered due to some confusion 
and negative comments by public officials, leading to runs and a dearth of liquidity (Enoch 
2000).  
Over the next four years of implementation of the recapitalization scheme, the rate of 
nonperforming loans in the banking sector decreased dramatically, as shown by Sato 
(2005) in Figure 6. 
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  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
No. of commercial banks 239 222 208 164 151 145 142 138 
Total assets (ratio to nominal GDP) 72.8 84.3 79.8 71.8 77.8 70.9 65.8 63.9 
Total loans (ratio to nominal GDP) 55 60.2 51 20.5 21.3 21 22.7 26.6 
Loan to deposit ratio 104 105.7 85 36 37.3 38 43.2 54.3 
Loans/total assets 75.6 71.5 63.9 28.5 27.3 29.6 34.5 41.6 
Claims on government/total assets 0.2 0.2 0.1 34 43.6 39.3 35.7 30.2 
Capital/total assets 9.6 8.8 -12.9 -2.7 5.1 6.4 8.8 9.7 
Nonperforming loan ratio (gross) 9.3 19.8 58.7 32.8 18.8 12.1 8.3 8.1 
Nonperforming loan ratio (net) — — — — 11.1 3.6 2.9 1.8 
Notes: (1) “Claims on government” of banks on central government consist mainly of government bonds injected 
for banks’ recapitalization; (2) the nonperforming loan ratios for 1996–1998 are figures for the end of each 
fiscal year (the end of March 1997 to the end of March 1999); (3) nonperforming loan ratio (gross) = 
nonperforming loans/total outstanding loans x 100 nonperforming loan ratio (net) = (nonperforming loans – 
reserves)/total outstanding loans x 100.  
Source: Sato 2005. 
Experts originally were optimistic about the efficacy of the program. Lindgren et al. (1999) 
note that “the recapitalization program . . . saved [the] banks, and the government seems 
likely to get back at least a share of its investment sooner than originally envisaged.” 
However, optimism waned. In October 2000, the IMF evaluated the performance of the 
recapitalized banks as “satisfactory,” while noting that “return on equity has fallen short of 
business plans in several banks” (Giorgianni et al. 2000). Khambata (2001) writes that the 
restructuring program had “produced some insignificant results,” noting the increase in 
total external debt, the high amount of nonperforming loans, and the fact that a 4% CAR 
requirement was low, even for a developing country (Khambata 2001).  
Following the recapitalization program, Bank Universal, Bank Prima Express, Bank Arta 
Media, and Bank Patriot were merged with Bank Bali to become Bank Permata. 
Immediately after its recapitalization, Bank Universal’s capital adequacy ratio dropped 
quickly, as a result of overaggressive loan growth, inefficient management of foreclosed 
assets, high costs in managing liabilities, and general vulnerability in the banking sector 
affecting the bank’s performance. Meanwhile, Bank Internasional Indonesia was placed 
under bank restructuring status in 2001 after shareholders struggled to resolve problems 
with the legal lending limit on group-affiliated loans as per terms of the recapitalization 
agreement (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004).   
188
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
Problems also arose from the lengthy implementation of the recapitalization scheme. 
Authorities did not follow the plan as outlined when announced. Additionally, the first two 
banks chosen to receive injections were seen as political choices rather than needs-based 
selections, affecting the market. Three months later, in December 1998, President Habibie 
partially retracted his decisions on which banks would receive injections, and preparations 
for the implementation of the scheme truly began (Enoch et al. 2001). 
Both the call options and COEs offered to shareholders were also met with public 
controversy as they were perceived as disadvantageous to the government while 
advantageous to the shareholder. However, the government used the recapitalization 
terms as an opportunity to encourage controlling shareholders to incur the costs of the 
recapitalization, as well as to provide itself an exit strategy in divestment through the call 
options on government-owned shares (Suta, Musa, and Slangor 2004). 
For state banks, some moral hazard behaviors emerged as a result of the “too big to fail” 
label on state banks also undergoing recapitalization. As bank managements were 
indifferent to losses, there was little incentive to recover loans, with nonperforming loans 
rising during the crisis14 (Enoch et al. 2001). 
The sheer size of the required recapitalizations led to deep cuts in government expenditure 
on development and subsidies. In 2002, almost 40% of government expenditure was used 
for debt service payment. The share of subsidies in government expenditure was reduced 
from 29% in 2000 to 12% by 2002 (Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu 2003). Total debt 
expenditure over time can be seen in Figure 7.  
  
 
14 Enoch et al. state that it is unclear whether the rise in nonperforming loans was due to “genuine corporate 
distress or opportunistic nonperformance” (Enoch et al. 2001). 
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Figure 7: The Indonesian Government’s Debt Service Payments  






1999 1999–2000 2000 2001 2002 
Total Debt (domestic + 
external) 22.902 29.485 62.911 63.106 57.691 115.274 136.367 
External Debt 22.902 29.485 54.526 40.876 26.453 49.023 72.942 
 
Principal 13 12.75 30.337 20.818 7.623 19.746 43.967 
 
Interest 9.902 16.735 24.189 20.058 18.83 29.277 28.975 
Domestic Debt 0 0 8.385 22.23 31.238 66.251 63.425 
 
Bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.9 
  Interest 0 0 8.385 22.23 31.238 66.251 59.525 
Note: In trillions of rupiahs.  
Source: Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu 2003. 
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